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• Mathematical definition : function 
• Mathematical definition revisited : probability mass function (pmf)







The bad of pmf : Model-free perturbation attack
The good of pmf : Hardware Trojan detection
Conclusion and perspectives





























No analytical expression of physical functions
















DATA = 1 octet 
MEASURE = Output of the 
acquisition chain (power 
probe+ampli+oscilloscope) at one 
instant  = power
M=# of bits of the data
N=vertical resolution of the 
oscilloscope
Leakage function: DATA → MEASURE
{0 ; 2M-1} → {0;2N -1} 
Example 1: power measurement













DATA = 1 octet
MEASURE = Output of the 
acquisition chain (micro-
probe+ampli+oscilloscope) at one 
instant = « Probe »
M=# of bits of the data
Leakage function: DATA → MEASURE
{0 ; 2M-1} → {0;1} 
0
Example 2: micro-probing




1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
Error function : DATA → DATA
DATA = 1 octet
DATA = DATA modified by the 
pertubation mean =  1 octet (of 
hidden data) 
M=# of bits of the data
{0 ; 2M-1} → {0 ; 2M-1} 
Example: laser bench
























1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Or 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
Or 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
NOISE
Limitation : definition has to take NOISE into account
Classical math definition : linked with models used to 
perform model based attacks (DPA, DFA, DBA, FSA, etc.)
PHYSICAL FUNCTION : PROPOSAL OF A NEW MATH 
DEFINITION
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« Noisy » physical function 
= 
Joint probability mass function (pmf)
Example 1:
DATA:  D → R and
MEASURE: M → R
DATA and MEASURE are considered as two discrete random variables with 
sample spaces
D={0 ; 2M-1} and 
M={0;2N -1} 
Our proposal :
The joint pmf of the discrete variables DATA*MEASURE is 
fDATA*MEASURE: R2 →[0;1] defined such that
fDATA*MEASURE(x,y)=Pr(DATA=x,MEASURE=y) whatever x and y ∈ R




Data ∈ {0 ; 28-1} 
Leakage function: Power(x)= Gauss(10*HW(x) , 4 ) with x ∈ {0 ; 28-1} 




Software implementation of the AES-128
32-bit microcontroler evaluation board (without countermeasure)
Oscilloscope Tektronix DPO 7104 (1 GHz)
Plain texts (known) :  XX 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ( XX ∈ [0:255] ) 
Measure =  power consumption during round 1
Data = output of Sbox 1 
Key (known) :  43 00 00 …. 00 00




Data ∈ {0 ; 28-1} 
Measured pmf on a 32 bit microcontroller (S Box1) :
EXAMPLES OF PMF: MEASURE OF LEAKAGE 
FUNCTION





« Start of 
middle 
round »
« End of 
middle 
round »
EXAMPLES OF PMF: MEASURE OF LEAKAGE 
FUNCTION










Data ∈ {0 ; 2M-1} 
0
Modified_Data(x)= x + ei with x ∈ {0 ; 28-1} and ei=2i with
p(ei)=1/8 and i ∈{0,7} i.e « random monobit fault »
Associated pmf








Fault injection principle :
• reduction of one period of the clock (∆T) ,
• fault injection by clock set-up time
Characteristics of clk generator :
• resolution of ∆T : ~ 35 ps à 100 MHz,
• low cost platform (FPGA Xilinx),
• easy set-up.
Target
• AES-128 on FPGA (virtex 3 board)
• Fault during the computation of round 9, i.e fault on 
round[10].start
•∆t from 50 to 130 (*35ps) by step of 1 










Data ∈ {0 ; 2M-1} 
0
































For all hypothesis K on k[10]
• Compute round[10].start from C and K
• Compute round[10].start* from C* and K
• Display pmf(K)
Compare the pmf(K) for all K









THE BAD OF PHYSICAL FUNCTION: ATTACK
COMPARISON STEP
Entropy of the pmf with 100 pairs of correct and uncorrect cipher texts for every 
key hypothesis:
Fault but « not too










AES-128 on an FPGA
HW Trojan: Add « probes » (i.e. additional wires from an internal signal 
to an I/O) in the design 
THE GOOD OF PHYSICAL FUNCTION: HW TROJAN 
DETECTION
Fundamental hypothesis: the HW Trojan modifies the PMF

























Measure pmf for circuit without (pmf1) and with Trojan (pmf2) and 
compute pmf1-pmf2
No difference Difference= TROJAN Small difference ∆
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
Conclusion
• Proposal of a definition of « physical functions » : pmf
• Link with “classical” models and measurements
• Examples of the use of such a definition
• Model-free attack with error pmf
• Detection of HW Trojan with error pmf
Perspectives 
• Model-free attack with leakage pmf
• Detection of HW Trojan with error pmf
• Combination of error and leakage pmf
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